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Capital Flows in Asia 
Takatoshi Ito 
8.1 Introduction 
It was just a few years ago that capital flows to Asian emerging markets 
were praised as a model for the rest of the world. A majority of capital 
flows to Asia took the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than 
portfolio investment. Although portfolio investment is quick to come and 
quick to go, it is less likely, many believe, for FDI to reverse direction. 
Capital flows to Asia increased investment, which in turn contributed to 
Asian nations’ achieving higher growth. Then high growth performances 
attracted furthei- capital inflows. A virtuous cycle of capital flows and eco- 
nomic growth was indeed an important part of the Asian miracle. In the 
wake of the Asian crisis, however, the praises all but disappeared. Even 
Asia could not withstand the shocks of volatile capital outflows caused by 
a sudden change in investors’ expectations. 
When the baht was floated on 2 July 1997, it was hardly a surprise for 
many foreign exchange dealers, treasury officials and central bankers of 
G7, and academic economists. However, few predicted that the exchange 
rates would depreciate as much as they actually did or that the crisis would 
spread to other countries in the region, especially to Korea, in the follow- 
ing months. Indonesia had been praised by the World Bank until just be- 
fore the Thai devaluation. There was little sign of trouble in Korea until 
three months after the baht devaluation. There was no warning of con- 
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tagion in the International Capital Markets report of 1997 (published 
in September 1997). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial 
support package was negotiated and accepted by the Thai authorities in 
August, followed by Indonesia in November and Korea in December. Af- 
ter six months, there is no clear assessment whether the contagion has 
stopped. It turns out that the Asian currency crisis of 1997 is broader and 
deeper than the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95. 
From the end of June to the end of December 1997, the Indonesian 
rupiah depreciated more than 140 percent, while the Korean won and the 
Thai baht depreciated more than 80 percent, vis-a-vis the US. dollar. The 
Malaysian ringgit and Philippine peso depreciated about 50 percent. Even 
the Singaporean dollar and Taiwanese dollar depreciated close to 20 per- 
cent. The least affected were the Hong Kong dollar and Chinese renminbi, 
both of which kept the nominal exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. 
Stock prices in these countries have also plummeted. In the ASEAN-4 
(Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) and Korea, stock 
prices fell by more than one-half from January to December of 1997. 
Withdrawal of funds from the stock market by foreign investors at least 
partly explains a simultaneous collapse of stock and currency markets. 
These exchange rate and stock price movements reflect the strong out- 
flow of capital from these Asian countries. Even relatively large foreign re- 
serves, in terms of import months, were not enough in Thailand and Ko- 
rea. In the case of Thailand, speculations in the forward market exhausted 
foreign reserves (in terms of spot-forward net positions) and, in the case of 
Korea, refusal of rollovers to Korean commercial banks by foreign banks 
exhausted the “usable” Korean foreign reserves. 
The Asian cases of 1997 also suggest a strong contagion. Countries in 
the region are greatly affected by a currency crisis in any one of them. 
Although there are similarities among countries in crisis, differences are 
also pronounced. Common features include external shocks, the yen- 
dollar exchange rate movement, and internal factors such as a weak bank- 
ing system and large short-term borrowings. One cannot deny the possibil- 
ity that a crisis in one country suddenly changes investors’ minds about 
the prospects of other countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
how capital flowed into Asia from 1991 to 1996. Section 8.3 summarizes 
the crisis of 1997. The similarities and differences between Mexico and 
Asian countries, and also those among Asian countries, will be shown. In 
section 8.4, lessons from this episode of currency crises will be drawn. 
Section 8.5 concludes. 
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8.2 Capital Flows to Asia 
U 
8.2.1 Overview 
Capital flows to Asia have been a focus of intensive study in the last 
several years, especially after the currency crisis of the 1997. Figure 8.1 
shows the total gross capital inflows-direct investment, portfolio invest- 
ment, and other capital flows (78bed, 78bgd, 78bid lines of International 
Financial Statistics, 1MF)-to the ASEAN-4 and China for the period 
1976-97. Several characteristics are evident. First, capital flows to these 
countries increased markedly in the 1990s (until the crisis of 1997). Sec- 
ond, capital flows to China after 1993 dwarf the flows to other countries. 
Third, among ASEAN countries, Thailand was the largest recipient of 
capital flows between 1988 and 1996. However, with the currency crisis, 
Thailand’s inflows became outflows in 1997. Fourth, capital flows to Indo- 
nesia and Malaysia were larger than those to other countries from 1982 
to 1984, but have declined since then. 
Let us focus on net private capital flows in the 1990s and compare Asia 
with other regions. Table 8.1 shows global capital flows to developing and 
transition economies. Net private capital flows to emerging markets in- 
creased sevenfold from 1990 to 1996. In 1990, total capital flows to emerg- 
ing markets (developing countries and transition economies) were about 
$30 billion, of which two-thirds went to Asia and one-third to Latin Amer- 
ica. In 1993, the total amount of capital flows was up to $160 billion, of 
which Asia and Latin America received about 40 percent each. A majority 
of flows to Asia took the form of direct investment and an overwhelming 
portion of flows to Latin America took the form of portfolio investment. 
Fig. 8.1 Capital flows to Asia: All types 
Table 8.1 Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets (US$ billions) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Emerging markets 
Total 31.0 126.9 120.9 164.7 160.5 192.0 240.8 173.7 
FDI 17.6 31.3 37.2 60.6 84.3 96.0 114.9 138.2 
Portfolio 17.1 37.3 59.9 103.5 87.8 23.5 49.7 42.9 
Others -3.7 58.4 23.8 0.7 -11.7 72.5 76.2 -7.3 
Total 19.1 35.8 21.7 57.6 66.2 95.8 110.4 13.9 
FDI 8.9 14.5 16.5 35.9 46.8 49.5 57.0 57.8 
Portfolio -1.4 1.8 9.3 21.6 9.5 10.5 13.4 -8.6 
Others 11.6 19.5 -4.1 0.1 9.9 35.8 39.9 -35.4 
Total 24.9 29.0 30.3 32.6 35.1 62.9 72.9 -11.0 
FDI 6.2 7.2 8.6 8.6 7.4 9.5 12.0 9.6 
Portfolio 1.3 3.3 6.3 17.9 10.6 14.4 20.3 11.8 
1. Asia 
la.  Affected 
Others 17.4 18.5 15.4 6.1 17 1 39.0 40.6 -32.3 
Total 10.1 26.1 56.0 64.3 47.4 35.7 80.5 91.1 
FDI 6.7 11.0 13.6 12.8 24.3 25.3 36.9 51.2 
Portfolio 17.5 14.7 30.4 61.1 60.6 -0.1 25.2 33.5 
Others - 14.0 0.3 12.0 -9.5 -37.5 10.5 18.5 6.5 
Total 3.5 -2.4 7.2 12.2 18.4 29.8 21.3 34.5 
FDI -0.3 2.4 4.2 6.0 5.4 13.2 13.1 18.2 
Portfolio 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.5 4.1 2.9 2.9 7.3 
Others 3.7 -4.8 2.9 I .7 8.9 13.6 13.6 9.0 
Total -1.7 67.4 36.0 30.6 28.5 30.7 28.7 34.3 
FDI 2.2 3.5 5.9 5.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 11.0 
Portfolio 1.1 20.7 16.3 16.3 13.7 10.2 8.9 10.8 
Others -5.0 43.3 8.4 8.4 7.0 12.5 11.8 12.6 
2. Latin America 
3. Transition economies 
4. Other regions 
Source: IMF, lnternutionul Cupitul Murkets, September 1998 
Notes: “Others” includes short- and long-term credits, loans (not including use of IMF credit), currency and deposits, and other accounts receivable and 
payable. “Other regions” includes the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. 
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The large ratio of portfolio flows to Latin American countries in 1991-93 
became a source of instability in the wake of, if not a trigger of, the Mexi- 
can peso crisis. In 1995, net portfolio investment to Latin America became 
negative in the wake of the Mexican peso crisis. The total private flows 
also declined sharply. Capital flows to Latin America recovered sharply 
only in 1996, contributing to a new record high for the capital flows to 
emerging markets exceeding $240 billion, of which about one-half went to 
Asia and one-third to Latin America. 
Several reasons for the sharp rise in capital flows from 1990 to 1996 
have been pointed out in the literature. First, a declining trend of the in- 
terest rates in the advanced countries prompted institutional investors to 
search for high-yield opportunities in many emerging markets.' The pur- 
suit of high yield was reinforced by the investors' desire to diversify their 
portfolio internationally. Second, on the recipient side, emerging markets 
liberalized restrictions on inward investment. Some developing countries 
introduced economic reforms including financial sectors. Others allowed 
direct investment into various industries. These factors are analyzed in 
IMF (1995). 
During the episode of strong capital inflows, several host countries com- 
plained that the volume of capital inflows was too great and was causing 
adverse side effects, overheating domestic economies to speculative ap- 
preciation pressure. Thailand and Malaysia in particular received inflows 
amounting to more than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Thailand was accumulating foreign reserves as a result of intervention to 
prevent appreciation even with current account deficits of 8 percent (of 
GDP) in 1 995796. Without intervention, the currency would have appre- 
ciated. Intervention was probably only partly sterilized. There are some 
signs that capital inflows contributed to a real estate boom in Thailand 
and Malaysia. More detailed discussions on the inflow problem are found 
in IMF (1995). 
The picture changed sharply in 1997. The Thai baht was effectively de- 
valued in July of that year and the Thai government asked the IMF for as- 
sistance in August. The currency crisis spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Korea in the subsequent months. Private capital fled from 
these countries. In the end net private capital flows to Asia fell from $1 10 
billion in 1996 to a mere $14 billion in 1997. Net portfolio investment to 
Asia became negative in 1997 for the first time since 1990. If the affected 
countries-Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand- 
1. An influence of the U.S. interest rate on global capital flows to the emerging markets 
was pointed out in the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. The declining interest rate in the United 
States from 1992 to 1994 prompted a large volume of capital flows to Latin America and 
other emerging market economies. The rapid interest rate hike in the United States from 
February 1994 to the summer of 1994 is thought to be one of the many reasons for capital 
outflows from Mexico, which finally caused the currency devaluation in December 1994. 
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were singled out, the net private capital that fled was on the order of $1 1 
billion. Even during the crisis, FDI to Asia did not decline from 1996 to 
1997. This reflects both investors’ confidence in the long-run prospects of 
Asian economies and host countries’ willingness to be acquired in hard 
times. It is also notable that portfolio flows declined sharply in both the 
Latin American countries in 1995 and the Asian economies in 1997. How- 
ever, the drop in portfolio flows was much more dramatic among Latin 
American countries in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis. 
In terms of total net private capital flows, the decline among Asian 
countries from 1996 to 1997 was much more dramatic than the decline for 
Latin American countries from 1994 to 1995. There are two factors to 
consider. First, in the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the crisis was effectively 
stopped by the IMF packages to Mexico at the end of January 1995 and 
to Argentina in March 1995. In contrast, the Asian currency crisis spread 
from Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. This contributed to a much larger 
decline in net capital flows to Asia in 1997 than to Latin America in 1995. 
Second, in both crises, bank lending and credits were sharply reversed (see 
“Others” line in table 8.1) among Asian economies. 
8.2.2 Scenario: Virtuous and Vicious Cycles 
Net capital inflows make it possible for a host country to run current 
account deficits without running down foreign reserves. They increase the 
resources that the host country can use. In Asia, capital inflows were 
mostly used for investment. The saving rate is already high in many Asian 
countries, especially in Malaysia and Singapore, but the investment rate 
is even higher. Investment, both FDI and domestic companies and govern- 
ment projects, is believed to have contributed to higher growth. Higher 
growth in turn invites more investment. 
One  of the factors that helped exports and economic growth of the East 
Asian countries in the last two decades was a long-term trend of yen ap- 
preciation. There are at least two ways yen appreciation contributes to 
economic growth of the Asian economies. First, as the yen appreciates, 
Asian products become more price competitive against Japanese goods in 
the world markets, especially in the Japanese and U.S. markets. For ex- 
ample, Korean shipbuilding, steel, and semiconductors are direct competi- 
tors to Japanese counterparts in the world market. Although they may not 
compete directly in the same quality category, they indirectly compete in 
the same product category. Hence, yen appreciation promotes business 
chances for manufacturing companies based in East and Southeast 
Asian economies. 
Second, yen appreciation has convinced many Japanese companies of 
the benefits of moving production facilities out of Japan. Looking for pro- 
duction sites where high-quality workers are available at low wages, Jap- 
anese manufacturing companies shifted production abroad, mainly to 
Capital Flows in Asia 261 
Asia.2 Technological transfers with Japanese management helped the 
Asian countries increase productivity in manufacturing. Some of the facil- 
ities in Asia became productive enough to export to the United States, 
Japan, and the rest of the world. 
Hence, the low interest rate and yen appreciation were external shocks 
to the Asian economies in 1994-96. Yen appreciation produced more Jap- 
anese direct investment in Asia. Foreign direct investment from Japan and 
other advanced countries provided the host countries with technology 
transfer and export capability. Asian exports grew at the rate of 20 to 30 
percent. Low interest rates in the industrial countries including Japan pro- 
duced the portfolio flows to the Asian economies. Those portfolio flows 
were used for investment rather than consumption. Asian economies were 
totally confident in their export-led growth strategy and the World Bank’s 
“East Asian miracle” gave a seal of approval. 
The currency “stability” vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar was instrumental in 
bringing in direct and portfolio investment. The investors had confidence 
in Asian countries that were virtually pegged to the U.S. dollar. The cur- 
rency risk was considered by the investors and borrowers to be minimal, 
and the credit risk was also considered minimal due to high economic 
growth. The interest rates in the Thailand were higher than in the United 
States, and that invited bank deposits and short-term bond investment. 
Growth in one Asian country is further amplified by growth in other 
countries in the region, as countries are connected by trade and investment 
flows. The “multiplier” of growth among countries in the region was con- 
sidered to be rather high. 
Large curreqt account deficits in some countries were a source of con- 
cern for some economists. But high economic growth made it possible to 
assert that the “grow-out-of-debt” scenario would work. The low total 
productivity growth pointed out by Young (1992, 1994) and Krugman 
(1994) raised some doubts about the sustainability of high growth. But 
industrialization and sophistication of the industries were impressive 
enough to erase these doubts. Essentially, high growth invited more capital 
inflows, which produced even higher exports and economic growth. This 
is the virtuous cycle, as schematically depicted in figure 8.2. Until 1996, 
almost all observers were confident that the virtuous cycle would work for 
the foreseeable future. 
The virtuous cycle was suddenly interrupted in 1996-97. Exports from 
most Asian countries sharply declined for several reasons. The yen depre- 
ciation from 1995 to 1997 reduced Asian goods’ competitiveness. Slow 
growth produced lower economic growth. However, even before the crisis, 
there had been growth recession: From 1995 to 1996, the growth rate in 
2. Japanese manufacturing companies also shifted their production to North America, 
partly to avoid trade conflicts and partly to prepare for NAFTA. 
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Low Interest Rate Yen Appreciation 
Foreign Reserves Increase 
Fig. 8.2 A ,  Capital inflow phase, 1990-95; B, Capital outflow phase, 199698 
Thailand was down from 8.8 percent to 5.5 percent, in Malaysia from 9.5 
percent to 8.6 percent, in Singapore from 8.7 percent to 6.8 percent, and 
in Korea from 8.9 percent to 7.1 percent. On the other hand, growth was 
hardly affected in Indonesia, the Philippines, China, and Taiwan. 
The growth rate of Japanese FDI and portfolio flows to Asia was slow- 
ing down due to the yen depreciation, but capital flows to Asia continued 
to be strong because of increased flows from Europe and the United States 
in 1996. In fact, there was no significant change in FDI and capital flows 
until the devaluation in July 1997. 
Japanese FDI to Asia, mostly assembly plants of finished products, has 
stimulated industrialization. Factories built by Japanese FDI, however, 
continue to require imports of parts and semifinished goods from Japan. 
The domestic production of parts has become a challenge for Asian coun- 
tries, which have recorded large trade deficits against Japan. (An exception 
is Indonesia, which records surpluses against Japan.) 
Once the currency was destabilized in July-August 1997 among 
ASEAN countries, capital inflows to the region were cut substantially. As 
discussed above, net private capital flows to the Asian region in 1997 be- 
came only one-tenth that of 1996. Most of the outflows took place in 
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B External Factors 
Yen Depreciation 
Current Account Balance 
I C a p i t a l O u t n o w I  
Currency Depreciation 
Other Countries 
speculative attack 
IForeign Reserves Decrease 
Fig. 8.2 (cont.) 
banking flow reversal. All the logic of the virtuous cycle worked in reverse. 
The vicious cycle (see fig. 8.2) set in after September 1997: Capital out- 
flows caused the currency to depreciate; depreciation made the real econ- 
omy and the banking sector weaker; weak economies made investors pes- 
simistic; and pessimism encouraged further capital outflows. 
8.2.3 FDI to Asia 
Foreign direct investment to Asia has increased steadily during the 
1990s. Table 8.2 shows the FDI flows to selected Asian countries and econ- 
omies measured by host countries’ a~thori t ies .~ 
From table 8.2 (panel A), it is evident that all Asian countries signifi- 
cantly increased FDI inflows during the 1990s. The increases are most 
3. Precise definitions of FDI are different from country to country. Some countries include 
reinvestment, others do not; some countries count both the foreign investment and domestic 
partners’ contributions in the case of joint ventures; most countries are on the reporting 
basis, while China is on the disbursement basis; and for Singapore and Malaysia, only manu- 
facturing sectors are included, while for other countries, all sectors are included. For precise 
definitions, see the comparative table of definitions in Economic Planning Agency (1998, 
80). Therefore, numbers are not exactly comparable across countries. 
Table 8.2 Gross FDI Inflows (US$ millions) 
A. Time-Series of FDI Inflows 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
China 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Singapore 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Vietnam 
3,500 
803 
2,302 
1,224 
8,751 
8,029 
6,517 
96 1 
512 
4,400 
1,396 
1,778 
1,425 
8,778 
4,988 
6,202 
778 
1,147 
1 1,000 
895 
1,46 1 
1,678 
10,323 
10,022 
6,975 
284 
1,926 
27,500 
1,044 
1,213 
1,966 
8,144 
4,285 
2,443 
520 
2,615 
33,800 
1,317 
1,63 1 
2,833 
23,724 
5,875 
4,321 
2,374 
3,722 
37,500 
1,941 
2,925 
3,423 
39,915 
16,492 
3,652 
1,871 
6,524 
42,400 
3,203 
2,461 
4,054 
29,931 
13,124 
6,812 
967 
8,497 
45,300 
6,971 
4,267 
3,979 
33,833 
10,616 
4,018 
1,993 
5,550 
B. Cross-Section by Source Country, 1995 
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong China Singapore Malaysia Philippines Thailand Indonesia 
1995 1994 1995 1995 1995 1994 1995 1995 1995 Total 
Total 1,914.4 1,523.9 566 37,520.5 4,852.4 4,242.5 1,871 16,492 39,914.7 108,897.4 
United States 644.9 293.7 198 3,083 2,075.8 473.6 621.9 2,582.2 2,770.5 12,749.6 
Japan 418.3 391 5 14.1 3,108.5 1,152.5 667.1 101.2 7,891.4 3,792 18,036.1 
Germany 44.6 91.5 386.4 247.6 0.9 174.7 1,344.6 2,290.3 
United Kingdom 86.7 29.2 -85.5 914.1 35.5 125 301.8 6,322.1 7,728.9 
France 35.2 15.5 287 18.9 26.2 498.4 881.2 
Netherlands 170.1 79.9 34.7 114.1 12.1 5.6 360 776.5 
Switzerland 9.8 -39.6 63.5 13.2 100.3 44.9 192.1 
Other EU 0 37.2 345.5 382.7 
EU total 346.4 216.1 -90.4 2,028.4 13.2 334.1 131.5 689.8 8,938.3 12,607.4 
Others 504.8 623.1 -55.7 29,300.6 1,610.9 2,767.7 1.010.4 5.328.6 24.413.9 65.504.3 
Italy 263.3 20 49.6 22.8 355.7 
Source: Panel A: Economic Planning Agency, Japan, Asiun Economies 1998 (in Japanese), 1998. Panel B: Economic Planning Agency, Krizui Bunsrki 
(Econumic Analysis), no. 156, “Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Current Global Issues-APEC, FDI, New Regionalism and Environment” (by 
Kanemi Ban et al.), March 1998. 
Notes: Based on each country’s direct investment figures. China’s figure is based on disbursement basis. Others are on the approval basis. 
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significant in China, where there was a fifteenfold increase in six years 
(1990 to 1996, before the East Asian crisis). Other countries-Korea, Sin- 
gapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam-saw from twofold to fourfold 
increases in the first six years of the 1990s. 
Panel B of table 8.2 shows the source countries of FDI to Asia in 1995. 
Japan provided the most FDI to the total of nine Asian countries (the four 
newly industrializing economies [NIEs], ASEAN-4, and China). In some 
countries (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines), the United 
States is the leading FDI source country, while for others, Japan is the 
leader. Europe collectively was investing into Asia in an amount similar 
to the U.S. investment. However, for most Asian countries, the impact of 
FDI is dictated by the behavior of Japanese and U.S. investors. 
As the largest investor in the region, the role of Japan in FDI into Asia 
is crucial. The data are collected by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and 
are compiled on a voluntary (formerly mandatory) reporting basis. Table 
8.3 shows changes in the Japanese FDI to the nine Asian economies in 
the 1 9 9 0 ~ . ~  The Japanese FDI to the world was below $5 billion a year un- 
til 1980. It grew to more than $10 billion in 1984. Only two years later, the 
amount had doubled, exceeding $22 billion. It reached $67 billion in 1989. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, FDI in fact declined to $36 billion before 
rising again to about $50 billion. Out of the total FDI in the postwar 
period-$617 billion-more than half took place in the 1990s. The largest 
recipient is Indonesia, closely followed by Hong Kong and China. Japan 
invested in the NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) during 
the 1980s as well as the 1990s (the ratio of FDI investment in the 1990s to 
all the other years is below 60 percent). In contrast, more than 60 percent 
of Japanese FDI to Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines was made in 
the 199Os, reflecting both the rapid rise of these economies and the sharp 
rise in Japanese investment in them. At the beginning of the 1990s, Indo- 
nesia, Thailand, and Malaysia were the preferred destinations of Japanese 
FDI. On average Indonesia has received more than Y150 billion (about 
$1.3 billion) annually in the 1990s. By the mid-l990s, however, China had 
become the top host of Japanese FDI. In 1995, China received more than 
Y430 billion (about $4 billion) of Japanese FDI. 
Foreign direct investment is often said to be a preferred form of invest- 
ment for host countries. (Direct investment is usually defined as a pur- 
chase of more than 10 percent in equities of a particular company.) Com- 
pared with bank credits, bank deposits, or bonds, it is more difficult and 
costly to withdraw investments that have become factories and other real 
assets. Moreover, direct investment brings foreign management and tech- 
4. These numbers do not necessarily agree with host countries’ data presented in table 8.2, 
panel B. Possible reasons are mentioned in n. 3. 
Table 8.3 FDI from Japan, Time-Series across Countries (US% billions) 
1990-97 1951-97 1990s 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total Total (“h) 
Total 56,911 41,584 34,138 36,025 41,051 51,478 
Asia 7,054 5,936 6,425 6,637 9,699 12,380 
Malaysia 725 880 704 800 742 576 
Singapore 840 613 670 644 1,054 1,187 
Thailand 1,154 807 657 578 719 1,242 
Indonesia 1,105 1,193 1,676 813 1,759 1,608 
Philippines 258 203 160 207 668 719 
Hong Kong 1,785 925 735 1,238 1,133 1,149 
Taiwan 446 405 292 292 278 456 
Korea 284 260 225 245 400 450 
China 349 579 1,070 1,69 1 2,565 4,485 
Source: Annual Report of International Finance, 1999, Tokyo: Ministry of Finance. 
48,101 
11,634 
573 
1,117 
1,406 
2,419 
560 
1,489 
522 
416 
2,515 
54,025 
12,194 
792 
1,826 
1,869 
2,517 
524 
696 
450 
443 
1,989 
363,312 
71,958 
5,792 
7,951 
8,432 
13,089 
3,299 
9,150 
3,141 
2,723 
15,243 
617,206 
112,423 
8,298 
13,664 
11,701 
23,524 
4,620 
17,215 
5,427 
6,577 
17,716 
58.9 
64.0 
69.8 
58.2 
72.1 
55.6 
71.4 
53.2 
57.9 
41.4 
86.0 
- 
Notes: FDI from Japan in this table is on the “reporting basis” of cross-border investment. It may not match with actual disbursement because some 
reported investment may be canceled and some will be carried out without reporting (no penalty). New FDI financed locally or reinvestment from past 
FDI is not covered by this table. FDI numbers are announced in yen after 1995. They are converted to the U.S. dollar using the average exchange rate of 
the year. 
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Fig. 8.3 FDI and the yen-dollar rate 
nology transfers, which are expected to contribute to improving industrial- 
ization levels of a host country. 
8.2.4 FDI Determinants 
According to the virtuous cycle hypothesis, FDI from Japan is moti- 
vated by optimistic expectations of the prospects for the Asian economies 
and yen appreciation. The Japanese firms moved production to Asian 
economies as the yen appreciated. The level of the yen-dollar rate influ- 
ences the flow of FDI from Japan to Asian countries. Figure 8.3 shows the 
correlation between the level of the yen-dollar rate and FDI from Japan to 
Asian co~ntries.~ This shows the rapid rise of FDI from 1986 to 1989, 
which appears to be a lagged response to the sharp yen appreciation (drop 
in the yen-dollar rate) from 1985 to 1988. 
Foreign direct investment flows from Japan to Asia, in aggregate or in 
individual countries, can be analyzed in a more rigorous manner. For ex- 
ample, the yen-dollar exchange rate is an important motivation for FDI 
flows from cost-conscious Japanese manufacturing firms. For each indus- 
try, there seems to be a threshold value of the yen such that, when the 
firm judges that the yen is persistently above the threshold, it moves its 
production facility to Asia. It may take a year to convince the firm that 
the yen is “persistently” above a certain level, so the yen-dollar rate is 
lagged one period. But in this way generally the yen-dollar exchange rate 
can be understood to determine the locations of production facilities for 
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5.  The Asian countries in this illustration include the four NIEs, ASEAN-4, China, and 
other broadly defined Asian countries. The category follows “Asia” in the Ministry of Fi- 
nance data source. 
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Japanese exporters. The most labor-intensive portion of the production 
process is often outsourced first, after which the semifinished or finished 
products are then exported back to Japan or other countries. 
Japanese FDI is also motivated by the prospect of the growth of Asian 
economies, as some of the products are intended to be consumed locally. 
Japanese auto makers have set up production, sometimes in joint ventures, 
in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, for example, mainly to sell autos in 
those countries. This is done primarily to avoid high tariffs on auto im- 
ports. 
With these considerations, the log of FDI flow from Japan to Asia is 
regressed on the log of the yen-dollar exchange rate (lagged one year) and 
growth rate, in aggregate or the individual countries. Unfortunately, the 
FDI data are only available annually, and the sample period is from 1976 
to 1997. Table 8.4 shows regression results. 
In the aggregate specification, the log of aggregate FDI flows from 
Japan to eight Asian countries (four NIEs and ASEAN-4), FDI8, is re- 
gressed on the log of the yen-dollar exchange rate of year t - 1 and the 
average growth rate of these eight countries. The negative coefficient of 
the yen-dollar rate implies that FDI from Japan to the eight Asian econo- 
mies tends to increase as the yen appreciates (drop of the yen-dollar rate). 
The positive coefficient of the growth rate implies that an increase in 
growth rates of the Asian economies tends to increase FDI from Japan to 
these economies. 
For individual countries, the log of aggregate FDI flows from Japan to 
an Asian country is regressed on the log of the yen-dollar exchange rate 
of year ( t4 -  l), and the growth rate of year (t). Results in general confirm 
effects of the yen-dollar exchange rate and the optimistic expectation, 
driven by actual growth rate, on the FDI flows from Japan. In each econ- 
omy, either the yen or the growth rate is statistically significant (at least at 
5 percent, except for Taiwan, where there is significance only at 10 per- 
cent) with expected signs. In Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia, both 
variables are significant. 
8.2.5 
When foreign capital flows in as direct investment, it has at least two 
positive effects on the economy. First, it adds to the domestic saving to be- 
come funds for investment. Second, it often comes with technology spill- 
overs. 
There are many studies of the impact of FDI on the host country.6 Re- 
cent studies, such as Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (2000) and Urata 
Effects of FDI on the Economy 
6. For an overview of the theory of FDI and its surge in the 1980s, see Graham and 
Krugman (1991, 1993). A seminal work on Japanese FDI is Kojima (1978). 
Table 8.4 Determinants of FDI 
Growth 
Dependent (of respective R2 
Variable Constant Trend Log(Yen(t - 1)) economy) D. W. 
Log(FDI8) 
Log(FD1Kor) 
Log(FD1Tai) 
Log(FD1Hon) 
Log(FD1Sin) 
Log(FD1Tha) 
Log(FDI1nd) 
Log(FD1Phi) 
Log(FDIMa1) 
12.439 
(3.02) 
[0.003] 
10.842 
(2.50) 
[0.013] 
4.534 
(1.32) 
[0.186] 
12.854 
(2.98) 
[0.003] 
15.820 
(2.76) 
[0.006] 
6.520 
(1.52) 
[0.129] 
5.673 
(0.65) 
[0.515] 
30.05 
(4.38) 
[O.OOO] 
-8.392 
(- 1’.37) 
[0.172] 
0.058 
(1.38) 
[O. 1681 
0.024 
(0.58) 
[0.013] 
0.147 
(4.33) 
[O.OOO] 
0.056 
(1.33) 
[O. 1841 
0.022 
(0.46) 
[0.643] 
0.164 
(4.00) 
0.057 
(0.66) 
[0.509] 
-0.101 
(-1.70) 
[O ,0001 
[0.089] 
0.260 
(4.54) 
[O.OOO] 
-1.111 
(-1.71) 
-1.335 
(-1.83) 
-0.397 
(-0.67) 
[OSOO] 
- 1.425 
(-2.03) 
-1.915 
(- 1.99) 
-0.880 
(- 1.25) 
[0.2 131 
-0.156 
(-0.1 1) 
[0.912] 
[0.087]* 
[0.068] 
[0.042]** 
[0.047]** 
-4.604 
(-3.98) 
[O.OOO]*** 
1.804 
(1.80) 
[0.072]* 
0.068 
(2.41) 
[0.015]** 
0.128 
(7.18) 
0.069 
(1.87) 
[0.06 11 * 
0.010 
(0.18) 
[0.855] 
[O.OOO]*** 
-0.027 
(- 1.38) 
[0.169] 
0.146 
(4.26) 
0.145 
(2.37) 
[O.OOO]*** 
[0.012]** 
-0.060 
(-1.95) 
[0.051]* 
0.132 
(4.27) 
[O.OOO]* ** 
0.86 
1.65 
0.74 
1.55 
0.81 
0 .59  
0.68 
0.96“ 
0.81 
1.44 
0.92 
2.02 
0.36 
1.95 
0.86 
2.16 
0.84 
1.81 
Note: Sample period, 1976:l-1996: 1. Estimations are executed by RATS with the “Rnbusterrors” op- 
tion, using a consistent covariance matrix allowing for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (LAGS = 
2), when necessary. 
FDI8 = the sum of FDI from Japan to the four NIEs and ASEAN-4. 
Log(Yen) = log of the yen-dollar rate, average of the year. 
Growth rate = growth rate of the respective economy of the equation. In the case of FDI8, the 
growth rate is the weighted average of growth rates of the eight economies, with nominal GDP in 
dollars as weights, in percent. 
‘Sample period 1977:l-1996: 1. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are in brackets. 
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and Kawai (2000), show the significant technological spillovers to the sub- 
sidiaries in Asia from the Japanese manufacturing  firm^.^ 
The growth rate of the Asian economy is regressed on the level of FDI 
in year (t - l), the change in the yen-dollar exchange rate, Japan’s growth 
rate, and the U.S. growth rate. Yen appreciation (drop in the yen-dollar 
rate) will enhance competitiveness of Asian exporters that compete with 
Japan’s exporters. Therefore the change in the exchange rate will promote 
exports of the Asian economies, contributing to their economic growth. 
The coefficient of the change in the yen-dollar exchange rate is expected 
to be negative. The two most important markets for most Asian economies 
are Japan and the United States. Therefore, the income effects of Japanese 
and US. economic growth should appear in the economic growth of Asian 
economies as positive coefficients on Japan’s economic growth rates and 
US. economic growth rates.8 
Our main interest here is whether the lagged FDI will increase economic 
growth rate, controlling for the exchange rate and the economic growth 
rates of the two most important trading partners. The specification that 
only FDI of year (t - 1) is included assumes a high dissemination of tech- 
nology transfer and a temporary boost of productivity. The statistically 
significant positive coefficient on the FDI term is indicative of growth- 
enhancing technology transfers. 
Table 8.5 shows the regression results. For the aggregate of the eight econ- 
omies, results are consistent with the theoretical predictions mentioned 
above. The first row shows the result for the aggregate of the eight Asian 
economies (the four NIEs and ASEAN-4). The weighted average of growth 
rates of the economies tends to increase when the level of FDI from Japan 
7. Belderbos, Capannelli, and Fukao (2000) examined the determinants of local contents 
among 157 Japanese electronics manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia. Local contents, the sum 
of in-house value added, and local outsourcing are considered to be a key for benefits to 
host countries, as they yield technology transfers. The authors found that local contents are 
lower in greenfield subsidiaries, subsidiaries of R&D-intensive parents, and export-oriented 
subsidiaries in ASEAN-4 and China. In contrast, local contents are higher in export- 
oriented subsidiaries located in the NIEs in those subsidiaries that have a higher domestic 
sales ratio, and in subsidiaries of a vertical keiretsu firm with strong intrakeiretsu supplier 
relationships. Urata and Kawai (2000) attempt to measure the intrafirm spillovers by com- 
paring total factor productivity changes in the parent and subsidiaries. They found that 
capability to absorb technologies, reflected in educational level and in experiences in indus- 
trial production, in the host countries is very important for them to absorb technology trans- 
fer from foreign firms, both in the forms of intrafirm technology transfer and local technol- 
ogy transfers. 
8. The major channel to growth from the exchange rate, Japanese growth, and U.S. growth 
is considered to be through exports. The “East Asian miracle” (World Bank 1993) was very 
much a story of tremendous export growth. In the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, 
many economies in Asia achieved sustained export growth of 20 percent or more. Export 
promotion, instead of import protection, was a successful incentive. All Asian countries, 
which were agrarian economies only decades ago, rapidly modernized manufacturing firms 
and began to export more sophisticated manufactured goods. See Ito (1998b) for a detailed 
analysis of Asian export deceleration in 1995-96. 
Table 8.5 Impact of FDI on Growth Rate 
~ 
Dependent R2 
Variable Constant Log(FDIx(t - 1))” YenChg Japangr USgr D. W. 
Asia8gr 0.422 
(0.20) 
[0.838] 
Korea 0.603 
(0.13) 
Taiwan 5.598 
(2.95) 
[0.003] 
Hong Kong 16.945 
(4.68) 
[O.OOO] 
Singapore 8.925 
(2.79) 
[0.005] 
Indonesia 9.173 
(1.24) 
[0.215] 
[0.212] 
(continued) 
0.589 
(2.30) 
0.827 
[0.021]** 
(1.25) 
[0.212] 
-0.241 
(-0.77) 
-1.813 
(-4.05) 
-0.056 
(-0.14) 
[0.890] 
-0.3.52 
(-0.35) 
[0.442] 
[O.OOO]*** 
[0.720] 
-0.058 
(-3.25) 
-0.080 
(-2.36) 
-0.1 16 
(-3.99) 
[0.001]*** 
[0.018]** 
[O.OOO]*** 
-0.035 
(-0.66) 
0.073 
(1.17) 
[0.238] 
0.021 
(0.73) 
[0.460] 
[0.512] 
0.361 
(3.02) 
[0.003]*** 
0.445 
(1.98) 
[0.048]** 
0.474 
(2.15) 
[0.032]** 
0.113 
(0.40) 
[0.686] 
-0.216 
( -0.55) 
-0.175 
(-0.72) 
[O.SSS] 
[0.469] 
0.237 0.14 
(3.41) 1.79 
[0.001]*** 
0.468 0.14 
(1.19) 1.89 
[0.235] 
0.497 0.51 
(4.18) 2.74 
0.268 0.25 
(0.98) 2.15 
[0.327] 
0.097 0.17 
(0.57) 1.32 
[0.566] 
0.141 0.21 
(0.54) 1.22 
[0.590] 
[O.OOO]** * 
Table 8.5 (continued) 
Dependent 
Variable Constant 
Thailand - 1.250 
(- 0.66) 
[0.508] 
Malaysia 2.690 
(1.30) 
[0.193] 
0.953 
(0.25) 
[0.803] 
Phi 1 i p p i n e s 
Log(FDIx(t - 1)y 
1.108 
(3.88) 
0.888 
(3.06) 
0.270 
(0.37) 
[0.710] 
[O.OOO]*** 
[0.002]*** 
YenChg 
-0.078 
(-1.68) 
[0.092]* 
0.102 
(2.42) 
-0.012 
(- 0.16) 
[0.875] 
[0.015]** 
~ 
R2 
Japangr USgr D.W. 
0.795 0.117 0.32 
[0.001]*** [0.482] 
0.061 0.008 0.16 
(0.24) (0.06) 1.24 
[0.810] [0.951] 
0.497 -0.388 0.18 
(1.09) (-0.68) 0.95 
[0.276] [0.493] 
(3.40) (0.70) 1 .oo 
Note: YenChg is the percent of the yen rate change from year ( t  - 1) to year (t). 
Japangr is the growth rate of Japan. 
USgr is the growth rate of the United States. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are in brackets. 
stands for the country. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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in the preceding year is high, implying the boost to productivity associated 
with FDI. The growth rate becomes higher if the yen appreciates (a neg- 
ative sign denotes yen appreciation) from the preceding year. Higher 
growth in Japan and the United States helps the growth of these econo- 
mies. Estimates are that a 10 percentage point appreciation in the yen in- 
creases the average Asian growth rate by 0.5 percent in these economies. A 
1 percentage point increase in Japanese and U.S. growth rates increases the 
average Asian growth rate by 0.4 and 0.2 percent respectively. 
For individual economies, results are not as prominent as the aggregate 
equation. The FDI effect on growth is evident for Hong Kong, Thailand, 
and Malaysia. The yen-dollar exchange rate seems to influence growth in 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia. In these economies, a 10 percent- 
age point appreciation in the yen boosts the economic growth rate by 1 
percent. Japanese economic growth has a positive spillover effect on Ko- 
rea, Taiwan, and Thailand, while U.S. economic growth has a positive ef- 
fect only on Taiwan. Regressions for Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philip- 
pines did not produce any meaningful result. 
8.2.6 Portfolio Flows 
Portfolio investment consists of equities, bonds, and other securities in- 
vestment. Bank deposits and lending and cross-border transfers between 
bank branches are usually classified as “other types” of capital flows. 
Table 8.6 shows three types of gross capital flows-FDI, portfolio, and 
other-to Korea, ASEAN-4, and China, The values are in terms of their 
percentage of GDP so that the relative impact to the economy can be as- 
sessed. Between 1994 and 1996 (that is, after the Mexican crisis and before 
the Asian crisis), these countries received a large amount of capital inflows, 
but composition was very different across countries. 
China and Malaysia are the two countries that encouraged and received 
FDI. Their portfolio inflows are minimal or even negative in the case of 
Malaysia. Except for Malaysia in 1992 and 1993, other types of capital in- 
flows were also very small. 
Thailand received the most capital inflows measured as a percentage of 
GDP between 1993 and 1996. The total capital inflows were about 10 
percent of GDP between 1993 and 1996. Most notably, portfolio inflows 
and other types of inflows were higher than FDI. Since portfolio or other 
types of capital flows are considered to be much more mobile than FDI, 
this feature was an ominous sign of the coming currency crisis, at least in 
retrospect. The precise mechanism of movement of “hot money,” however, 
is debatable. 
In the case of the Mexican crisis in December 1994, it has been argued 
that sudden and massive outflows in the days after the “surprise” 15 per- 
cent devaluation is to blame for bringing down the peso by almost 50 
percent in one week. Mostly, short-term securities investment, especially 
Table 8.6 Different Types of Capital Flows as a Percentage of GDP 
Korea Thai 1 and Indonesia Philippines Malaysia China 
Year FDI POR OTH FDI POR OTH FDI POR OTH FDI POR OTH FDI POR OTH FDI POR OTH 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
0.31 0.09 2.17 2.85 -0.04 8.17 1.03 
0.40 0.79 2.38 2.04 -0.08 9.77 1.27 
0.24 1.61 1.60 1.89 0.83 5.81 1.39 
0.18 3.17 -0.44 1.44 4.36 5.38 1.27 
0.21 2.14 3.58 0.95 1.72 6.82 1.19 
0.39 3.04 4.70 1.23 2.43 11.53 2.16 
0.48 4.37 5.07 1.29 1.98 6.55 2.72 
0.64 2.78 -1.88 1.97 2.80 -13.13 2.18 
-0.09 
-0.01 
-0.07 
1.14 
2.19 
2.04 
2.20 
- 1.23 
3.29 1.20 -0.11 3.56 5.44 
3.62 1.20 0.28 5.00 8.31 
3.47 0.43 0.29 5.55 8.89 
1.38 2.28 1.65 4.52 7.80 
-0.87 2.48 1.41 5.56 5.99 
1.20 1.99 3.53 4.10 4.73 
0.11 1.82 6.14 7.63 
-0.21 1.51 0.67 5.18 
-0.59 -0.21 0.90 0.00 0.28 
0.35 1.03 1.08 0.14 1.11 
-1.92 5.46 2.31 0.08 -0.85 
-1.10 11.59 4.58 0.61 -0.10 
-2.28 -2.64 6.25 0.73 -0.28 
-0.50 3.72 5.14 0.10 0.73 
4.93 0.29 0.16 
4.91 0.85 0.94 
~ ~ ~~ 
Source: IMF, International Financiul Stutistics, 1998. 
Notes: FDI = foreign direct investment, line 78bed. 
POR = portfolio investment, 78bgd. 
OTH = other capital flows, 78bid. 
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tesobonos, by mutual funds and institutional investors were quickly with- 
drawn. Large portfolio investments have the potential to cause such a sud- 
den reversal of capital flows when investors’ assessments of the country 
change. 
8.2.7 Bank Lending 
In order to understand further what kind of money is invested, cross- 
border bank lending is investigated. Table 8.7, panel A, shows the balance 
of cross-border bank lending from industrial countries to developing 
countries. Total liabilities and short-term liabilities of recipient countries, 
as of end-June 1997, are shown in the first two columns. The breakdown 
of total lending, by countries of lending banks to each borrowing country 
is shown. The general tendency is for Japanese and European banks to 
lend to Asian countries, while U.S. and European banks lend to Latin 
American countries. Among the Asian countries, Japanese banks have 
higher shares in Thailand (54 percent), Indonesia (39 percent), and Ma- 
laysia (36 percent), while European banks, collectively, have more than 40 
percent of shares in China, India, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Among the 
Latin American countries, U.S. banks’ share is between 20 and 28 percent, 
while that of European banks is about 50 percent. 
As a percentage of GDP, total bank liabilities are highest in Thailand 
(0.38 I), followed by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea. These countries have 
higher ratios of bank liabilities to GDP than any Latin Americancountries. 
Bank lending behavior is supposedly different from securities invest- 
ment. Although they are short term, bank loans are often made with the 
implicit underetanding of rolling over indefinitely. If the interest rate 
spread is maintained, bank lending is usually rolled over. However, once 
banks suspect that credit (default) risk has become critical, any interest 
rate spread may not keep the bank lending. 
In order to assess the vulnerability to potential problems with bank 
lending, such as a sudden refusal of roll-overs, short-term lending to the 
foreign reserves is examined. The ratio of the stock of short-term liabilities 
to foreign reserves represents one possible measure of this type of vulnera- 
bility. If the ratio is higher than one, it implies that if all banks refuse to 
roll over the short-term loans, foreign reserves will be exhausted. Among 
Asian countries, the ratio exceeds one in Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
These three countries needed IMF assistance later in 1997. In retrospect, 
this indicator would have been effective in predicting the Asian currency 
crisis. Among Latin American countries, the ratio exceeds one in Argen- 
tina and Mexico. 
In table 8.7, panel B, the changes in these bank liability indicators from 
1993 to 1997 are shown. For Asian countries, bank liabilities tended to 
increase for both the total liability to GDP ratio and the short-term liabil- 
ity to foreign reserve ratio. The exception is China for the latter indicator. 
Table 8.7 Cross-Border Bank Lending 
A. International Bank Lending to Selected Emerging Markets, June 1997 
By Maturity By Nationality of Lending Banks Short-Term 
Total Liability Short TotallGDP Liabilit y/Foreign 
(US$ millions) (Up to 1 year) Japan United States Europe (96) Reserves 
China 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Asia 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Latin America 
57,922 
58,726 
103,432 
28,820 
14,115 
25,163 
69,382 
389,441 
44,445 
71,118 
17,573 
16,999 
62,072 
251,086 
30,137 
34,661 
70,182 
16,268 
8,293 
21,966 
45,567 
242,273 
23,891 
44,223 
7,615 
6,698 
28,226 
13 1,304 
32 
39 
23 
36 
15 
12 
54 
32 
4 
7 
8 
8 
7 
6 
5 
8 
10 
8 
20 
10 
6 
8 
23 
23 
23 
20 
28 
24 
48 
38 
35 
44 
48 
57 
28 
40 
59 
45 
51 
59 
43 
50 
0.071 
0.265 
0.213 
0.293 
0.162 
0.092 
0.381 
0.158 
0.096 
0.146 
0.105 
0.185 
0.234 
1.629 
2.106 
0.609 
0.726 
0.243 
1.411 
1.303 
0.772 
0.447 
0.674 
1.187 
B. Comparison of 1993 and 1997 
Short-Term 
Total Liability/ Liability/ Japanese Share U S .  Share European Share 
GDP Foreign Reserves (“A) (“/o, (“/.I 
1993 1997 1993 1997 1993 1997 1993 1997 1993 1997 
China 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Asia 
0.047 0.071 0.509 0.234 40 
0.192 0.265 1.622 1.629 55 
0.119 0.213 1.397 2.106 30 
0.166 0.293 0.210 0.609 41 
0.108 0.162 0.499 0.726 17 
0.069 0.092 0.175 0.243 27 
0.207 0.381 0.733 1.411 55 
40 
32 
39 
23 
36 
15 
12 
54 
32 
2 
8 
10 
10 
44 
16 
8 
9 
5 
8 
10 
8 
20 
10 
6 
8 
36 
27 
33 
34 
32 
41 
24 
34 
48 
38 
35 
44 
48 
57 
28 
40 
Argentina 0.107 0.158 1.193 1.303 7 4 32 23 49 59 
Brazil 0.118 0.096 0.930 0.772 17 7 17 23 43 45 
Chile 0.227 0.146 0.557 0.447 9 8 33 23 42 51 
Colombia 0. I40 0.105 0.433 0.674 17 8 28 20 31 59 
Mexico 0.138 0.185 1.029 1.187 7 7 35 28 42 43 
Latin America 10 6 28 24 45 50 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, Basle, January 1998. 
Notes: Europe includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Total liability/GDP and 
short-term liability/foreign reserves are June 1993 and June 1997; the country shares are December 1993 and June 1997. 
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The cases of Thailand and Malaysia stand out in their increases in the 
latter indicator. Asian countries relied on bank lending for their eco- 
nomic development. 
For Latin American countries, movements are mixed. Between 1993 
and 1997, some countries increased the total liability to GDP ratio and 
the short-term liability to foreign reserve ratio, while other countries de- 
creased these ratios. 
The salient feature of the country share movement is the rapid expan- 
sion of European banks in both Asia and Latin America. In aggregate, 
European banks increased their share of lending to Asia by 6 percentage 
points, while the Japanese banks decreased lending by 8 points. In the case 
of Latin American countries, the European banks increased their share 
from 45 percent to 50 percent, while both the Japanese and U.S. banks 
decreased their shares by 5 percent. If the lending boom to Asia was to 
be blamed, which is a controversial “if,” then the European banks were 
the ones that seemed to lay the last brick in Asia. 
In China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan, European banks 
increased their share markedly at the expense of Japanese banks, while in 
the Philippines, European banks increased their share at the expense of 
the United States. Only in Thailand did Japanese banks maintain a sig- 
nificant share. 
8.2.8 Too Much Capital Flows? 
As explained in the beginning of this section, capital flows, especially 
FDI, are in general part of a ‘‘virtuous cycle” in developing countries. 
However, when the volume of capital flows, especially short-term flows, be- 
comes too large, monetary policy becomes difficult. (See Khan and Rein- 
hart 1995 for one of the earliest studies of this topic. See also IMF 1995.) 
Capital flows to Asian countries have been sometimes massive, sometimes 
exceeding 10 percent of GDP. 
When the size of capital inflows becomes larger than current account 
deficits, there is an appreciation pressure on the currency. Having adopted 
the de facto dollar peg, many Asian countries have resisted the apprecia- 
tion pressure by intervening in the foreign exchange market. The stability 
in the exchange rate was considered to be important for nurturing ex- 
porting industries and inviting FDI inflows. As intervention continued, 
levels of foreign reserves among Asian countries soared in the 1990s. Inter- 
vention can be sterilized or left unsterilized. Unsterilized intervention will 
increase the monetary base, resulting in lower interest rates. The stimulat- 
ing effect of lower interest rates may cause inflation if the economy is al- 
ready at the full capacity of production, which is often the case for emerg- 
ing market economies that attract massive capital inflows. 
In order to avoid inflation, intervention can be sterilized. Sterilized in- 
tervention is a combination of foreign exchange intervention and domestic 
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open market operation to keep the monetary base constant (in levels or in 
proportion to GDP in a growing economy). Sterilized intervention will, in 
theory, keep the interest rate level. In practice, however, the interest rate 
may rise. Suppose the initial capital inflows were in the form of FDI. The 
domestic end of sterilization is most likely done in the short-term money 
market. Then, the short-term interest rate may increase, while the long- 
term interest rate will decline. The higher short-term interest rate will in- 
vite more capital inflows in the form of portfolio investment. Hence, steri- 
lized intervention may increase capital inflows. 
Of course, a story related in terms of a policy decision tree is only a re- 
flection of the well-known economics principle: It is impossible for a small, 
open economy to have free capital flow, a fixed exchange rate, and inde- 
pendent monetary policy. The usual theoretical answer to this impossibil- 
ity problem is to float the exchange rate. A more heterodox answer is to 
adopt some mild forms of capital controls on short-term inflows, such 
as raising the reserve requirements on bank deposits by nonresidents or 
imposing withholding taxes on short-term instruments held by nonresi- 
dents. Many emerging markets did in fact adopt market-based capital con- 
trols (see IMF 1995). 
There is an important footnote to the impossibility principle. Reducing 
fiscal deficits (or increasing fiscal surpluses) will ease the overheating 
pressure brought about by capital inflows. A contractionary impact of fis- 
cal surpluses, such as tax increases or expenditure cuts, is mitigated by the 
monetary stimulus of unsterilized intervention. In fact, several Asian 
countries, such as Thailand, adopted this option in the beginning of the 
1990s. Many Asian countries did run fiscal surpluses. 
The lessons on the danger of too much capital inflow seem to have been 
learned from the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95. The governments of 
many emerging markets have been vigilant about monitoring capital flows. 
The Asian countries, however, did run into a problem in 1997. The next 
section analyzes what happened to capital flows in the midst of the cur- 
rency crisis in Asia. 
8.3 The Currency Crisis of 1997 
8.3.1 Overview 
The Asian currency crisis has been analyzed in several papers and books 
(see Goldstein 1998; Krugman 1998; Montes 1998; Radelet and Sachs 
1998, 2000). Various reasons for the currency crisis were suggested, with 
three factors identified as the major causes. First, the de facto dollar peg 
as the currency regime contributed to generating the crisis. China and 
Hong Kong have maintained the nominal fixed exchange rate to the U.S. 
dollar. Before the crisis, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Korea all 
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adopted a currency basket system. However, they in fact had a high weight 
on the U.S. dollar in the basket (see Frankel and Wei 1994), so the ex- 
change rate regime was de facto dollar pegged. In the period of yen ap- 
preciation, Asian exporters enjoy high growth contributing to an overall 
high economic growth, while in the period of yen depreciation, Asian 
economies’ performance becomes less impressive. In fact, the yen depreci- 
ation from 1995 to 1997 was partly the reason for the lower growth of 
Asian economies (except the Philippines) in 1996-97. Moreover, the dollar 
peg with high interest rates invited in short-term portfolio investment. In- 
vestors and borrowers mistook the stability of the exchange rate for the 
absence of exchange rate risk. 
Second, a weak bank and nonbank sector complicated the currency 
crisis. Key industries of many Asian countries relied on bank lending for 
their fund needs. Banks in Korea were lending to industries that were 
deemed to be important from the point of view of industrial policy. Many 
Indonesian banks, including one or two state banks, had been seriously 
burdened by nonperforming loans. Thai finance companies (nonbanks) 
had large nonperforming loans from an asset inflation (1992-93) and de- 
flation (1996-97). A weak banking system becomes a signal to foreign 
speculators to attack the currency. When attacked, the central bank could 
employ a high interest rate policy to encourage capital to stay (or come 
in). But weak banks would make this policy counterproductive for the 
domestic banking policy. Knowing this, speculators are more willing to 
attack a country with a weak banking system. The banking crisis thus 
causes the currency crisis. Also, many bank liabilities and corporate debts 
were denominated in U.S. dollars. This was a reflection of the dollar peg. 
However, when the currency is devalued, dollar-denominated liabilities 
would become much larger in terms of the local currency. The currency 
crisis thus often causes the banking crisis. In this sense, the currency crisis 
and banking crisis are “twin crises” (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996). 
Third, short-term liabilities were mounting in some of the Asian econo- 
mies, most notably in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea (recall tables 8.6 
and 8.7). This short-term capital can be withdrawn quickly to put pressure 
on the exchange rate. Withdrawal of funds started slowly in Thailand in 
1996. Once the Thai baht was floated, neighboring countries were on the 
alert list of investors. Withdrawal of short-term funds intensified after Sep- 
tember. The refusal to roll over bank loans particularly put pressure on 
the Korean won. 
In addition to these common factors, there are idiosyncratic factors for 
individual countries. Speculative attack by hedge funds was a trigger for 
the Thai de facto devaluation, while Indonesia did not intervene so that 
foreign reserves were ample when it asked for a “precautionary” IMF 
program. The burst bubble was the major cause for weak financial systems 
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in Bangkok, while reasons other than bubbles explain the weak banking 
system in Seoul and Jakarta. Controls on capital accounts had been elimi- 
nated for a long time in Indonesia, while there were significant capital 
controls in Korea. Thailand went through financial liberalization several 
years prior to the currency crisis. Political conflicts were a major problem 
in Indonesia, while Thailand and Korea had a solid political foundation. 
More detailed analysis of mine can be found elsewhere (It0 1998a, 
1998b, 1998~). The rest of this paper is devoted to a concise summary of 
the observations, emphasizing the role of capital flows and offering some 
new perspectives. What is new in this paper is to emphasize the common 
factors and idiosyncratic factors of Asian currency crisis. But, first, back- 
ground of the crisis must be described. 
8.3.2 
Several changes in the Asian economic performance occurred in 1996. 
First, exports precipitously declined in most Asian countries. Export 
growth rates in 1994 and 1995 had reached 20 to 30 percent in China, Ko- 
rea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines. Then, in 1996, ex- 
ports of all countries went down sharply. Thai export growth, for example, 
slowed from more than 20 percent to virtually zero within a year. Korea 
and Taiwan suffered from a recession in the semiconductor industries. 
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 show the remarkable decline in exports of NIEs and 
ASEAN-4 in 1996-97. (More detailed analysis of export deceleration is 
found in Ito 1998b.) Second, because the region depended heavily on ex- 
ports, the decline in exports substantially brought down economic growth. 
Shift of the Wind in 1995-96 
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Fig. 8.4 Export (%value) growth rates 1981:l-972, NIEs 
Source: IFS. 
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Fig. 8.5 Export ($value) growth rates: 1981:l-97:2, ASEAN-4 
Source: IFS. 
Third, in some countries, such as Thailand, stock prices started to decline. 
All of these changes were signaling the end of a long boom. Capital flows, 
which are sensitive to yields, started to reverse direction. 
As exports declined and economic growth slowed, a virtuous cycle 
turned into a vicious cycle (recall fig. 8.2). 
8.3.3 Thailand 
The crisis first hit Thailand, which seemed most vulnerable by tradi- 
tional measures. In 1996, the current account deficit of Thailand had 
reached 8 percent of GDP, the same level that brought Mexico into a cur- 
rency crisis in 1994. The export growth rate plummeted from 20 percent 
per year to virtually zero, although a decline in the economic growth rate 
was only modest, from about 9 percent to 7 percent. In retrospect, it can 
be seen that Thailand had experienced a bubble economy from 1993 to 
1995. The economy was overheated and stock prices had soared in 1993, 
as capital flows increased, especially in the form of portfolio flows. (See 
Ito 1998c and Nukul Commission 1998.) 
Note that a major slow down in exports had also occurred back in 
1984-85. Recall that the dollar appreciated. This supports the working 
hypothesis described in the previous sections that dollar appreciation (yen 
depreciation) is bad for Asian exports and growth. 
After the asset bubble burst, banks in Thailand had nonperforming loan 
problems. In particular, finance companies faced serious problems and 
borrowed from domestic and foreign banks to finance their property 
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loans. The weakness in the financial system, along with large current ac- 
count deficits, invited speculative attacks on the baht. 
The speculative attack came in several waves, between December 1996 
and the spring of 1997, before the massive speculative attack in May 1997. 
For one week in May, some investors sold the baht in the spot market and 
others in the futures (or swap) market. The central bank intervened to 
defend the dollar peg regime, which had been in place since 1984. The 
dollar peg was considered to be instrumental to winning the confidence 
of foreign investors. The net result for the central bank position was to 
lose the foreign reserves in forward position. Although the announced, 
on-balance figure of the foreign reserve was close to $30 billion, it would 
be revealed later that the amount of off-balance dollar selling futures con- 
tracts exceeded $20 billion. Although the market knew that there were 
central bank interventions in the futures (swap) market, as a result of de- 
fending the baht from speculators, the precise number had not been 
known. When the central bank decided to float the currency on 2 July, the 
market was surprised only by the timing. 
In the case of the Mexican crisis, the Mexican government did not an- 
nounce the decline in foreign reserves for almost ten months. This non- 
transparent practice was criticized because market discipline could not 
work. This was one of the major reasons that the IMF introduced the 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). In the Thai crisis, the for- 
eign reserves figures were correctly disclosed every month with a one- 
month lag for statistics collection in compliance with SDDS. However, it 
was off-balance liability that was not disclosed to the market and that 
finally brought down the fixed exchange rate peg. 
After the baht was floated, it immediately depreciated by 15 percent. 
Within a few weeks, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia either 
floated or significantly widened the band. Central banks of these countries 
intervened occasionally, but the amount of intervention was limited. 
Although the rate was floated, the baht problem was not over. The Bank 
of Thailand was carrying large forward positions, and commercial banks 
had large short-term liabilities that could not be rolled over in the follow- 
ing months. The market knew that the Bank of Thailand was carrying 
forward contracts, but the amount was not accurately known. Thailand 
sought liquidity assistance from Japan and the United States in vain. In 
May the Bank of Thailand introduced capital controls that prohibited res- 
idents from lending money to nonresidents in offshore markets. The off- 
shore rate deviated from onshore rates in May and June, but deviations 
became very small after the rate was floated. By the end of July, Thailand 
decided to ask for assistance from the IMF. 
There were two kinds of problems in putting together an IMF program 
for Thailand. First, the amount of a support package would have to be 
large, and the limits on standby loans might not be enough. Second, it was 
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not clear what kind of conditionality should be mandated. After intense 
negotiations, Thailand agreed to IMF conditions that included tightened 
monetary and fiscal policy, as well as concrete action programs for finance 
companies. The assistance program also included contributions from Ja- 
pan and other Asian countries. The IMF’s portion was $4 billion (close to 
500 percent of quota for Thailand), while the other Asian countries, in- 
cluding Japan, pledged an additional $13.2 b i l l i ~ n . ~  It was a quite unusual 
arrangement in that the Japanese Export-Import Bank provided a parallel 
loan of $4 billion with the IMF. The agreement was signed on 20 August 
1997. 
As mentioned above, one of the problems that Thailand experienced 
during the crisis was the fragile financial system, in particular nonper- 
forming loan problems in the finance companies. In June, the worst sixteen 
finance companies were suspended. An additional forty-two finance com- 
panies were suspended before the IMF agreement was signed in August. 
The IMF program did not put an end to the depreciation of the baht. 
As a result, other currencies in the region became further affected. 
The loss of foreign reserves was a major concern in Thailand. The termi- 
nation of foreign bank lending was also a cause and effect of depreciation. 
Capital flows out of Thailand were acute (recall fig. 8.1), and they took 
place mostly in terms of bank lending withdrawal (recall table 8.6). 
8.3.4 Indonesia 
Indonesia was thought to be doing well with macroeconomic manage- 
ment. The exchange rate had flexibility (slow depreciation vis-a-vis the 
U.S. dollar on the slide schedule with a band around it) and intervention 
was restrained to conserve foreign reserves. Indonesia’s fundamentals 
were better than those of neighboring countries. Toward the end of Sep- 
tember, however, the Indonesian rupiah depreciated suddenly, and it was 
decided in Jakarta to seek IMF assistance. This decision was a little sur- 
prising in that there was little evidence that the central bank needed to 
build up foreign reserves at that point. Also, problems in the Indonesian 
economy lie in the real sector, namely, inefficient big national projects and 
nontransparent family businesses of the president. The IMF conditions 
would look quite different from those of other plans. 
On 5 November, the IMF program was agreed upon. At the same time, 
coordinated intervention by other Asian central banks was carried out to 
help prop up the value of the rupiah. A most remarkable aspect of the 
IMF program for Indonesia was to close down (not just suspend) sixteen 
banks with questionable assets. One bank was owned by President Su- 
harto’s son. Depositors were paid off only up to a certain amount. There 
9. The IMF’s contribution of $4 billion, or 500 percent of the quota allowed to Thailand, 
was considered to be the limit at that time, set by the precedent of the Mexican package. 
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was also no announcement about the health of the remaining banks. This 
caused a run on some of weaker banks. 
One area of uncertainty that was not completely resolved was the size 
of corporate debts to foreigners. Many firms borrowed from foreign banks 
(in foreign currency denomination), but the total amount was not known 
at the time. The IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) decided to extend $23 billion to Indonesia. The United States, Ja- 
pan, Singapore, and Asian countries pledged a “secondary line” of support. 
Having an IMF program, however, did not stop the depreciation of the 
rupiah. Ironically, a real currency crisis came after the IMF program was 
signed. In mid-December, a rumor of President Suharto’s poor health, 
based on his canceling an appearance at an international conference, 
pushed down the rupiah. Also, whether structural reforms would be car- 
ried out was questioned, especially after a bank that had been closed was 
replaced by a new bank managed by the same person at the same site. 
After President Suharto announced a new fiscal year budget on 6 January, 
which was more than 40 percent larger than the previous year’s budget, 
the rupiah was sold heavily. The rate broke the level of 10,000 rupiahs to 
the dollar and went down to the point where its value was just one-sixth 
of what it was a year earlier. The rupiah’s movement was much more in- 
fluenced by political news. In the process of rupiah depreciation, foreign 
investors’ role was not as heavy as capital flight. 
8.3.5 Korea 
Korea was initially thought to be remote from a crisis. Its fundamentals 
had turned around for better earlier in 1997. The exchange controls were 
reasonably stringent, so that it would be difficult to speculate against the 
won. Nonresidents cannot borrow the won. The Korean won did not de- 
preciate more than 20 percent until the end of October. However, suddenly 
in November, the currency came under heavy pressure. Foreign banks that 
had lent to Korean banks decided to withdraw funds by not rolling over 
their lending. The Korean central bank reportedly lent foreign reserves, as 
foreign currency deposits, to commercial banks, which could not raise funds 
without paying prohibitively high risk premiums (Korean premium). 
Korea decided to ask for IMF assistance toward the end of November, 
and obtained it on 4 December. Negotiation was carried out in an unu- 
sually fast manner. The amount of assistance was also unusually large. 
The IMF would provide $21 billion, supplemented by $10 billion from the 
World Bank and $4 billion from ADB. The United States, Japan, and 
other countries would provide additional $36 billion, bringing the total to 
$57 billion. 
One of the most critical elements in the Korean crisis was how much for- 
eign banks would roll over their lending to Korean banks. It was estimated 
that short-term liabilities would be close to $100 billion, if guarantees pro- 
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vided by the Korean corporations to their subsidiaries abroad are counted. 
Table 8.8 summarizes how Korea’s external liabilities have changed. 
Pressure on the won did not stop with the IMF program of 4 December. 
Acute problems in liquidity developed for Korean banks. It was not until 
24 December, when administrative pressure from monetary authorities of 
G7 was applied on commercial banks to maintain lending to Korean 
banks, that the crisis was contained. 
Recall that the short-term bank liability to foreign reserve ratio was 
highest in Korea (table 8.7). The Korean currency crisis, unlike that in 
Thailand or Indonesia, can be understood in terms of a “bank run” (Ra- 
delet and Sachs 1998, 2000). 
8.3.6 Contagion 
The experience of the Asian currency crises in 1997 certainly exemplifies 
the process of contagion. In the case of the Mexican peso crisis, the “te- 
quila effect” did not succeed in changing the exchange rate regime, despite 
pressures on Argentina and Asian countries. In the case of Asian currency 
crises, however, depreciation spread to a large number of countries. 
An interesting question for further research is whether a contagion 
model, such as that by Eichengreen and Rose (1996), would have predicted 
such spillovers at the point that Thailand decided to float. How much 
increase in probability of devaluation of the rupiah, the ringgit, and the 
Philippine peso would the Thai devaluation of 2 July have indicated? 
When investigated closely, a contagion process was more complicated than 
just spillovers from Thailand. Through the summer and up to September, 
the Thai baht was the currency most depreciated, followed by the rupiah, 
the peso, and the ringgit. From October to November, however, the de- 
grees of depreciation for the baht and the ringgit were about the same, 
nearly 40 percent. Up to November, the Korean won depreciated only 
about 15 to 20 percent. As the crisis in Seoul deepened, the won depreci- 
ated further. This process indicates that the direction of spillovers changes 
over time. This was not the case in a simple devaluation-led crisis like 
Mexico’s in 1994. 
Figure 8.6 shows the changes in the currencies of the NIEs and 
ASEAN-4. From July to October, the baht was the most depreciated cur- 
rency. Other ASEAN currencies were following the movement of the baht. 
The magnitude of the peso, ringgit, and rupiah depreciation was about one- 
half that of the baht depreciation until September 1997. Then the rupiah 
suddenly depreciated at the end of September. From September to No- 
vember, the rupiah movement seemed to influence other currencies. The 
Korean won depreciated sharply in December, reflecting the liquidity prob- 
lem mentioned above. The Indonesian rupiah depreciated further in Janu- 
ary 1998. Therefore, sources of contagion seem to shift from one country 
to another, as political and economic shocks occur in various countries. 
Table 8.8 Korea’s External Liabilities 
A. Residents’ External Liabilities 
Short-Term Liabilities Long-Term Liabilities 
Foreign Foreign 
Korean Bank Korean Korean Bank Korean Public Grand 
Banks Branches Corporations Total Banks Branches Corporations Sector Total Total 
December 1996 65.2 12.8 22.0 100.0 41.5 3.2 13.6 2.4 60.7 160.7 
December 1997 37.4 17.2 25.6 80.2 40.4 3.8 17.6 11.0 72.8 153.0 
B. External Liabilities to International Banks (by length of maturities) 
Total 
Maturities up to 
and Equal to 
One Year 
Maturities over 
One Year and up 
to Two Years 
Maturities over 
Two Years 
June 1996 
December 1996 
June 1997 
88,027 
99,953 
103,432 
62,332 
67,506 
70,182 
3,438 
4,107 
4,139 
13,434 
15,884 
16,366 
C. External Liabilities to International Banks (by lending bank nationalities) 
United United 
Total Japan States Germany France Kingdom Belgium Netherlands 
June 1996 88,027 22,512 9,582 8,529 6,994 4,140 2,312 1,651 
December 1996 99,953 24,324 9,355 9,977 8,887 5,643 3,731 1,926 
June 1997 103,432 23,732 9,964 10,794 10,070 6,064 3,899 1,736 
Source: Panel A: Bank of Korea (quote from Nikkei, 29 January 1998). Panels B and C: Bank for International Settlements, The Maturity, Sectoral, und 
Nurionality Distribution oflnternational Bunk Lending, Basle, January 1998. 
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8.4 Lessons: Capital Flows and Reversal 
Many reasons for capital inflows and their subsequent reversal have 
been suggested. Depending on which reason is accepted, the prescription 
to prevent a future crisis will be different. In this section, I review some of 
the current thinking on the issue.l0 
8.4.1 Moral Hazard 
A first hypothesis is that capital flows to Asia can be characterized as 
the result of moral hazard. Some observers have pointed out that the im- 
plicit guarantee of deposits and financial institutions by emerging markets 
invites too much capital flows (Goldstein 1997, 1998; Krugman 1998; Mc- 
Kinnon and Pill 1996). Deposits that pay higher interest rates than the ad- 
vanced countries are attractive to investors, especially when the economy 
is growing fast and the exchange rate stability appears to be secured. Mex- 
ico before 1994 and Thailand before 1997 are prime examples. The host 
countries received capital that could not be put into productive use with 
long-run returns exceeding the interest rates paid to creditors. In Mexico 
this resulted in a consumption boom and in Thailand a real estate boom. 
Investors remained complacent just before the crises because they felt 
their investments were protected by the government guarantee. In the case 
of Mexico, a large part of capital inflows were explicitly guaranteed be- 
cause they were government securities (tesobonos). In the case of Thai- 
land, capital flows that rapidly rose in 1994 to 1997 were through its off- 
shore banking facility (BIBF). Investors must have felt that deposits were 
implicitly guaranteed because the government would bail out banks, as in 
advanced countries. 
Moreover, investors may be reassured by the IMF's handling of Mexico 
in 1995, because investors were not asked to involuntarily roll over their 
investment. Borrowers were also mistaken. They might not have invested 
prudently. They tend to go for a high-risk, high-return project. If the proj- 
ect fails, the government would bail out the bank, and if the project suc- 
ceeds, the bank benefits. The situation is well known in the deposit insur- 
ance literature. Explicit and implicit guarantees caused the moral hazard 
among investors and borrowers. 
If moral hazard is the problem, there are two general solutions. First, 
prudential regulation on borrowers to avoid building the dangerous posi- 
tions is important. Second, burden sharing on lenders, once a problem 
develops, would deter future irresponsible lenders. 
One problem with this argument, however, is the timing of the crisis. 
Why the capital inflows reversed in 1997 so dramatically cannot be ex- 
10. I owe thanks to Dani Rodrik for suggesting to me some of the policy implications 
included in this section. 
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plained adequately from moral hazard. If the blanket guarantee was to be 
believed, there was no reason for investors to flee so quickly. 
Another problem with the moral hazard explanation is the cross- 
sectional differences. Why were Indonesia and Korea affected most se- 
verely, while the Philippines and Malaysia seem to have escaped the worst 
of the crisis? The blanket guarantees were the same for Asia, and other 
macroeconomic fundamentals were similar. The moral hazard argument 
alone would not explain the cross-sectional differences. 
One way to combat the moral hazard problem is to ask the involved 
parties to take losses from easy lending and borrowing. Many observers 
point out the problem of moral hazard on the part of borrowers. However, 
overborrowing is overlending. How could the IMF ask “lenders,” for ex- 
ample, those who held tesebonos in the Mexican crisis or who invested in 
fifty-eight companies in Thailand, to take losses? In fact, the IMF pack- 
ages are usually strict enough that countries do not accept them willingly; 
the penalty of mismanagement has been severe, negative economic growth 
for Mexico and Thailand after the crisis. There is little scope for moral 
hazard on the part of a country to mess up the economy (at least for a 
decade or two after one crisis). The IMF did not “bail out the country” 
in Mexico’s case because the money was repaid, as it will be in the Asian 
cases. What IMF packages bail out in Mexican-type crises is actually a 
group of lenders to the countries, by recovering the asset values (currency, 
stock, tesobonos, Brady bond, and other bond prices). If Mexican teso- 
bonos holders had been asked to take some losses in the Mexican peso 
crisis, they might not have extended so much credit to some of the Asian 
countries that got into trouble in 1997. It would be difficult to devise a 
program to ask for a fair share of burdens on lenders without causing an 
international systemic risk, unless the IMF intervenes swiftly. 
Another solution is to strengthen prudential regulations. Thailand re- 
laxed banking regulations and capital controls without strengthening 
bank supervision. Finance companies were outside of the more strict bank 
regulation. A lack of policy contributed to easy lending. Korean merchant 
banks were outside the bank regulation that restricted large lending to 
a single customer. A lesson here is that financial deregulation has to be 
accompanied by strengthening bank and nonbank supervision. 
8.4.2 Bank Run 
Radelet and Sachs (1 998, 2000) argue that the Asian currency crises 
were caused by sudden shifts in investors’ behavior. Those countries that 
relied on short-term capital inflows were caught in the liquidity crisis when 
investors refused to roll over lending. In the case of the Mexican crisis 
of 1994-95, it was the short-term government securities (tesobonos) that 
became a focus of the rollover problem. In Thailand and Korea, domestic 
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banks could not obtain enough dollars to repay short-term borrowings 
when rollovers were refused. Banks were not insolvent by any standard. It 
was a liquidity problem, or a problem of bank run (Diamond and Dyb- 
vig 1983). 
When the currency crisis of a country is analyzed as a bank run, inves- 
tors’ behavior of withdrawing funds from the country does not have to be 
irrational. Given that other creditors are withdrawing funds, it is rational 
for an investor to withdraw funds. In fact, it is rational to be first in line. 
The situation in Korea in November and December 1997 fits the bank 
run model best. Korean banks faced an acute liquidity shortage in US. 
dollars and the monetary authorities helped them by providing the foreign 
reserves (as deposits to commercial banks). When foreign reserves were 
exhausted, there was no choice but to ask for the IMF’s assistance. 
If the bank run is the sole reason for the crisis, establishing the interna- 
tional lender of last resort would be a good solution. Suppose that the 
IMF was the international lender of last resort. The IMF would inject 
foreign reserves, and the central bank would help commercial banks un- 
wind the liability positions, when rollovers are refused. In fact, having the 
lender of last resort would convince lenders not to refuse to roll over. This 
is a straightforward application of the role of domestic central banks in 
international circumstances. If this analogy to the domestic central bank 
is applicable, the IMF lending to help prevent a bank run should not be 
tied to stringent conditionality, and disbursement must be quick and 
front loaded. 
The reservation about such an international lender of last resort also 
comes from the. analogy to the domestic central bank. In order to provide 
liquidity in a massive amount, the monetary authorities regularly conduct 
strict examinations. Weak institutions are closed or at least restricted in 
their activities. When a liquidity crisis occurs, the monetary authorities 
must have confidence that financial institutions are essentially sound be- 
fore they inject liquidity to help financial institutions. Similarly, the mone- 
tary authorities of the emerging markets have to demonstrate that the li- 
quidity support from the international lender of last resort does not go 
into insolvent institutions. Therefore any recommendation for establishing 
the international lender of last resort should be accompanied by the pro- 
posal to strengthen the banking system and its supervision. Moreover, in 
practice, it is often very difficult to distinguish the liquidity problem from 
the insolvency problem. 
The best solution to an international bank run is to make the IMF 
the international lender of last resort. Funding has to be increased and 
conditionality has to be relaxed. If necessary, a regional fund, comprising 
the neighboring countries that may be affected by contagion, should be 
created to supplement the IMF coffer. 
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8.4.3 Herd Behavior 
Similar to the idea of the bank run, the model of herd behavior has been 
developed in the finance literature. In relation to stock market crashes, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Banerjee (1992) developed the so-called 
herd behavior model. Investors behave as in a herd because it maximizes 
profits to behave as others do. When others are investing, it is more likely 
that prices will go up and the currencies will appreciate, so that it makes 
sense to invest. When others are withdrawing, it is rational to go along be- 
cause prices and currencies will go down. The self-fulfilling prophecy works. 
One might question this simple model by arguing that markets have a 
self-regulating mechanism that would bring the economy back to equilib- 
rium. A currency depreciation shock by capital flows should promote ex- 
ports and thus in the long run increase pressure to appreciate the currency. 
For example, depreciation would hurt the balance sheet of banks and cor- 
porations that borrowed in foreign currencies. Thus, lending from banks 
would be limited and the interest rate would rise. Business activities would 
be depressed and would struggle to obtain working capital. Depressed 
domestic demand, consumption, and investment would further depress 
business activities. 
In the meantime, if the inflation rate increases due to the depreciated 
currencies, the real exchange rate does not warrant much increase in ex- 
ports. Foreign debts (denominated in nominal terms in foreign currencies) 
are mushroomed in local currencies. 
The fate of Indonesia seems to fit this description of herd behavior and 
multiple equilibria well. How else could we explain the still-suffering econ- 
omy (at - 15 percent growth rate) at the exchange rate level that is one- 
sixth of the precrisis level? Other countries, such as Thailand and Korea, 
also have negative growth, even though their currencies have depreciated 
by 30 to 40 percent. 
Herd behavior can be dealt with by capital controls or a stand-still 
agreement imposed by the IMF. Temporary capital controls on outflows 
may calm the market. A stand-still agreement would be an effective tool 
to start the negotiation process of corporate debts or sovereign bonds. 
This would eliminate the incentive to withdraw funds first. 
8.4.4 Irrational Exuberance and a Bubble 
The last model is more ad hoc. Excessive capital inflows can be charac- 
terized by irrational “exuberance” (a famous word of Alan Greenspan’s 
on U.S. stock prices) that sooner or later results in an eventual crash. The 
stock prices and real estate prices of some Asian cities-for example, in 
Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia-increased so much because of the 
capital inflows, which were prompted by high economic growth. However, 
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at least in the end, the level of stock prices could not be rationalized by 
fundamentals. The stories of real estate bubbles in some Asian cities were 
similar to Japan’s bubble and burst cycle from 1985 to 1998. Ito and Iwai- 
sako (1 996) explain the stock price movements by applying the stochastic 
bubble model, a la Blanchard and Watson (1982). A similar methodology 
can be applied to the Asian crisis. 
8.4.5 Early Warning Signal 
It has become a popular exercise to look for variables that help predict 
a future crisis. Frankel and Rose (1996), Eichengreen and Rose (1996), 
Goldstein (1996), and Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) have 
contributed to the literature of early warning signals. Frankel and Rose 
(1996) identify, for example, the size of current account deficits and the 
composition of bank borrowing (short-term and foreign-currency- 
denominated loans) as factors that increase the probability of a future 
crisis (large devaluation). Goldstein (1996) lists seven factors as presump- 
tive indicators of vulnerability to a financial crisis: an upturn in interna- 
tional interest rates; a mismatch between the government’dbanking sys- 
tem’s short-term liabilities and its liquid assets; a large current account 
deficit; an overvalued exchange rate; a weak banking system and large fis- 
cal deficits that put constraints on the authorities’ willingness to increase 
interest rates; a boom in bank lending followed by a fall in asset prices; 
and high susceptibility to contagion due to similarities to a financial 
crisis elsewhere (more likely if the crisis is close by). Eichengreen and Rose 
also confirm a contagion effect, namely that probability of a crisis in- 
creases if a neighboring country experiences a crisis. Kaminsky, Lizondo, 
and Reinhart (1 997) attempt to calculate appropriate widths of thresholds 
of various macro variables. When an indicator moves beyond certain 
threshold levels, it is treated as a signal. In any given month, the system 
would estimate the probability of a crisis within the following twenty-four 
months conditional on the indicators issuing signals at that moment. The 
variables are chosen on the basis of indicating correct signals (while min- 
imizing false signals) for a crisis. Although the results are encouraging, 
there are as many false signals as correct signals even for variables that 
are less noisy. 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, characteristics of capital flows in Asia before and after 
the crisis of 1997 were summarized. Although some common factors are 
available, each crisis has its own idiosyncratic factors. In fact, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Korea present much different kinds of “food for thought,” 
just as their ethnic foods are different. Thailand is much like a classic 
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attack on the reserve for a country with large current account deficits, 
while Korea seems to be an international bank run. Indonesian problems 
cannot be understood without investigating political and social shocks. 
These differences reflect underlying bank and corporate liability struc- 
tures, which is a result of their policies during the capital inflow phase. 
The capital outflow crisis investigation must begin with research on capital 
inflows. For this reason, the detailed data analyses and the description of 
idiosyncratic factors in this paper may be useful for further research. 
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Comment Dani Rodrik 
Takatoshi Ito suggests in his conclusions that the crises in Thailand, In- 
donesia, and Korea offer different types of “food for thought,” just as the 
region’s ethnic foods differ. While the spices may have been different in 
each case, it seems to me that these were just condiments on the same old 
dish that international capital markets have been serving with regularity 
over the last twenty years. 
Whether driven by moral hazard, financial panic, herd behavior, or ir- 
rational exuberance, the boom-and-bust pattern of international lending 
appears to be integral to the operation of international financial markets. 
When the crisis strikes, it is always easy to find weaknesses in the bor- 
rowing economies to justify ex post the reversal of flows: crony capitalism, 
industrial policies, exchange rates pegged too rigidly to the dollar, weak 
financial sectors, implicit insurance, and so on. No one can doubt that 
these were problems of varying degrees of seriousness in the East Asian 
economies most severely affected. But it takes a large buildup of short- 
term external liabilities-denominated in a currency other than your 
own-to metamorphose these weaknesses into the financial and real melt- 
downs that Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea have experienced. Fig- 
ure 8C. 1. shows the close correlation between exposure to short-term debt 
and currency collapse in East Asia. 
Asian-style capitalism-with different ethnic spices in each case-did 
not evolve in the last five years. Furthermore, this is not the first time 
that many of these countries have experienced external imbalances. South 
Korea had a mini debt crisis in 1980 that cost it 5 percentage points of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in one year. But as Ito emphasizes, large 
capital inflows, particularly of a short-term kind, are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. We get the real fireworks only when domestic problems 
meet international financial markets. 
There is much useful information in Ito’s paper on the patterns of capi- 
tal inflows to the region. I must say I am less convinced than he is by the 
evidence on spillovers from direct foreign investment (DFI). Regressions 
of output growth on lagged DFI do not provide particularly meaningful 
evidence, in part because investors are forward looking and in part be- 
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